Implications of the New Nexus of Power
This is the fourth and last installment in a series of posts on the new nexus of power in the Arab world, between the political and economic elite (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3). Alternatively, we can call it the new elitism, characterized by neoliberal political-economic features that pervade much of the rest of the world, including the global north. But there’s at least one serious difference: the new elitism in the developing world, and certainly in the Arab world, is emerging at the expense of the rest of society, with hardly any benefits to the overwhelming majority of concerned populations. While close observers are aware that neoliberalism the world over is not kind to majorities, timing, stages, and eras, are of the essence. When it is adopted by already socially polarized, economically decrepit, and politically repressive states where (nearly all) individuals and groups are disempowered, the effects are daunting. It’s akin to driving without tires, whereby nearly every rotation of the wheels (e.g., policies, time, most “investments”) causes a damaging grinding of metal to asphalt. There is no cushion, and the safety net is fading back into the books and constitutions, leaving the (free) market to ever so wisely determine the allocation of resources, often under the auspices of a formerly socialist elite turned neoliberal by the lure of power and plenty.
In this last post, I will discuss some broad outcomes related to the impact of this phenomenon. This is a difficult task because it is not easy to disentangle the gamut of existing political, social, and economic ills that one observes in the region and attribute some of them neatly to the phenomenon at hand. To be sure, there are so many sources of polarization, poverty, repression, etc., that some analysts are finding it convenient to go back to the residual category of the cultural black box to explain everything horrible in the region (some have never left in the first place). It is possible, however, to highlight some problematic areas that have been exacerbated by the new elitism, and the modes of coping, resistance, governance, and living that it engendered. Systematic research is required to do rigorous process-tracing, but some of the direct and not-so-direct effects are inescapably evident, especially when one considers the new forms of collaboration between repressive political elites and (often) happily unaccountable business actors.
On the face of it, we can preliminarily divide the impact into a couple of categories. Politically, the new nexus of power between the political and economic elite seems to have buttressed authoritarian rule, whether or not other factors contributed to this outcome. This is not simply a function of “support” for the status quo by these elites, for this is the norm nearly everywhere. It is also a form of legitimation of the status quo because the corollary of this nexus involves various forms of “liberalization” or state retreat: a “budding,” “growing,” or seemingly “vibrant” civil society that may be considered a sign of political “opening;” a “freer” economic environment in which the state gives up its monopoly over some sectors of the economy; a large “private” sector that purportedly grows at the expense of the state-run “public” sector, giving way to a broader dispersion of resources with economically democratizing effects. Though these outcomes are pleasing to some external actors (including the amorphous conception, “the international community”), they are not felt in a positive manner by the overwhelming majority of the population who must fend for themselves as public provisions, jobs, and welfare dwindle.
The apparent social effects of the new elitism and the policies they engender are even deeper. It is not too challenging to demonstrate that the policies supported by this new nexus of power are responsible for unduly removing or destroying various forms of social safety nets (e.g., welfare, subsidies, job provisions) that kept populations afloat or barely above water for decades. If these provisions are not removed altogether then either their quality has deteriorated significantly (e.g., health, education) or rations have shrunk (e.g., bread, flower, sugar). Such drastic changes are contributing to two dangerously related phenomena: increasing poverty (including absolute poverty) and thus social polarization, whereby societies are increasingly losing their middle classes; secondly, economic exclusion from the “market,” a phenomenon contributing to a dramatic increase of the informal sector, or those who are functioning, and living, almost completely outside the market.
There continues to be support in the direction of reducing such provisions in the name of one thing or another (e.g., trickle down economics, tight state budgets, private sector alternative, importance of self-reliance and ending “dependence” on the state). All these rationales must be carefully examined, for most of them emanate less from a demonstrable conviction and intent to guarantee alternatives and more from the sheer desire and ability to deprioritize long-term collective interests and mass provisions.
The incremental—and not so incremental—goring of workers’ and labor interests in the private and public sectors is another outcome that can be easily traceable to policies and political decisions associated with the new elitism. The shifting of effective alliances from labor to business in various Arab regimes was part and parcel of the unraveling of state-centered economies. Rights, rules, and regulations increasingly favored business at the expense of labor as time went by, starting in the 1970s (officially or unofficially). Trade/peasant unions and labor organizations in countries like Egypt and Syria were coopted around that time by corporatist authoritarian systems of representation, but continued to enjoy some privileges. Therefore, it is true that the political elite started this process of shifting alliances and privileging capital long before business actors became prominent, but the sort of change taking place now has a different character. Earlier, such stripping of labor rights was considered a function of problematic authoritarian arbitrariness, something that is frowned upon socially and viewed as a departure from a social (developmental) contract of sorts.
The ideological context then was one of a socialist-nationalist coloring which provided a basis for judgment and norms. Hence, social polarization, poverty, and developmental exclusion were considered “wrong” and unacceptable. Today, such disturbing effects are the norm, a means to a “better” future, a legitimate station along the way to prosperity and efficiency.
Perhaps most significantly at some level are the developmental implications for a new elitism that vehemently emphasizes urban development (at the expense of the neglected countryside and its modes of production) and non-productive economic activity, characterized primarily by consumption. The increase in shares of the tourism and service sectors at the expense of manufacturing and agricultural production (associated with land re-reform laws and other regulations) is producing different kinds of needs in society. For instance, there is significantly less need for skilled labor, and the educational systems and institutions that would be required to train skilled labor. Whatever is arising in term of the “new economy” and Information Technology fields lags far behind other countries, is too small and too underdeveloped to substitute for losses in other sectors, and is certainly not competitive internationally. Employment of hundreds of thousands of yearly new entrants into the job market will continue to suffer accordingly because public policy—colonized as it is by the new elitism in the context of authoritarian governance—is unresponsive to these and other collective needs. The much heralded private sector is only picking up “shares” of fixed capital formation from the embattled and bloated public sector, but is no where near compensating for job losses, let alone accommodating new job-seekers.
And all this is supposed to be taken care of by a combination of measures that fall under the rubric of trickle down economics (private sector investment, foreign direct investment, new market institutions, new rules and regulations, the rule of law, etc.). That’s not nearly enough. The problem is not about rules and markets and will not be resolved as such. Whatever else is at work, the most egregious problems stem from various and continuing forms of disempowerment and denial of self-determination at the individual and collective levels. Most of these problems are being exacerbated by a new nexus of power that is as unrelenting as it is unchallenged. This new elitism is not the source of these problems, but the guarantee that they will fester.
Other side-effects of the new elitism relate to nationalist credentials, and I will not discuss them here, especially that the wide variation among different states makes it difficult to, well, generalize. Suffice it to say that the new breed, and often generation, of elites (political and economic) are likely to prioritize the status quo at the expense of national credentials/rights/sovereignty as they have very little leverage or bargaining power internationally. This reserved, market-oriented, and pro-status-quo “peace” (i.e., not rocking an even sinking boat) posture also applies to various forms of regional and identity-based solidarities associated with conceptions of resistance to hegemony, occupation, external meddling, etc. And while Syria is historically, and today, somewhat of an exception among Arab countries in this “nationalist credentials” regard, it is notable that the emerging elites of the “new” generation are very much unlike they predecessors—with the exception of the very top leadership. This complacency vis-à-vis the regional status quo (i.e., authoritarianism and a politically impotent new elitism, Israeli occupation/apartheid, US military involvement/occupation(s) and support for dictators, the rise as a result of rigid ideologies among parts of the opposition, and the continuing semi-delusional turn to the almighty amidst all this crap to solve problems, etc.) does not bode well for the majority of people in the region.
The neoliberal baby wants to come out in full force, بالمقلوب ! Not good.
Solutions Don’t Work. Work Does—Sometimes.
When I discuss the issues raised herein in academic or social settings, I invariably get the question: “So what’s the solution?” I usually do not have an answer to THAT question. But I have some broad thoughts about perspective and, perhaps, broad starting points.
To devise a “new system” as “the” solution is a non-starter. Collective-level decisions at the structural level (pertaining to everyone almost systematically) may end up being equally oppressive/disempowering. And to let the market “lead” is an increasingly deflated fantasy that even true believers are often veering away from or prefacing and qualifying. For the most part, advances and progress will occur incrementally and compartmentally so long as individuals and groups are not sufficiently empowered and decision-making is patently centralized. The formula or “solution” (if there is such a thing) depends on the case. I am neither ready nor willing to advance such overarching remedies here. And neither is any intellectually informed and honest observer/analyst.
Ultimately, we can make the banal assertion that there is no substitute to the empowerment individuals and group—through a variety of mechanisms (legal, institutional), policies (social and economic), and movement building—so they may fend for themselves and cease to be near-completely dependent on other social forces or even principles (or vestiges thereof) for their well-being, i.e., a decrepit semi-socialist “contract” or public policy with a deteriorating or counter-productive social-safety net. It is all too evident that the centralization of power and wealth locally and globally is a serious impediment.
External varieties of support for local forms of centralization (i.e., US support for regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt) are a serious derailment because they shift energies and focus from what the challenge really is to forms of politics that bode ill for a future absent such support. To be sure, as the Syrian case instructs, external (usually US or Western) support for strong centralized decision-making, or for neoliberal policies, in the region’s countries is not the cause or even a decisive factor in the development of their social, political, or economic problems. Local regimes do just fine—to oppress, disempower, plunder, and impoverish—without such support. Granted, however, such support complicates matters by creating a divergence from the more pressing issues
The bottom line is that “solutions” don’t work. This suggestion/assertion is not novel nor a discovery at all. Its value potentially lies in discouraging claims about a solution (whether it is about religion, other ideologies, or types of political systems). Holistic approaches to dealing with the ills, ailments, shortcomings, inefficiencies, deficiencies, and injustices involved in the region (and elsewhere) can have a counter-productive effect in a maturing polity, a feature that characterizes virtually all existing polities today. Fukuyama was wrong: we do not have the “End of Ideology.” But we do have the end of holistic ideologies as solutions that are adopted wholesale by populations—whether or not this was possible even in earlier eras.
What is needed is no longer “one” thing, or even “set” of things. In fact, what is needed desperately, even before thinking about a “solution” or even “treatment” is a different and more sober conceptualization of the current problems, in light of changing needs, demands, capacities, modes of interaction, and notions of scarcity. But waiting for such a conceptualization—let alone the naïve assumption that any such conceptualization will be broadly adopted or replace earlier ones—is futile for those who must deal with existing realities, ones under which they suffer and struggle. Hence, there is no substitute for all sorts of “work” to empower and assert individual and collective selves and rights. This is proceeding constantly and no one is waiting to learn about its necessity before acting to de(fend) (for) themselves. But there must be more deliberate attempts to create the spheres, spaces, and contexts within which such “work” at the individual and collective levels becomes more cumulative. Equally important is to disseminate such information and increase networking among those working towards similar goals, ending thereby the individual and collective isolation and atomization that characterizes the status quo.
The “talk” and “analysis” about equitable distribution of resources and restoration or adoption of rights is important, but increasingly inconsequential as it is appropriated by institutions and states that subvert such concepts and subordinate them to their own agendas. While it is not prudent to eliminate such vocabulary altogether (democracy, rights, rule of law, etc.), we can no longer take any of it at face value—except in quite rare occasions where there is no mediator or an opportunity for institutional exploitation.
One set of fears is associated with the failure of such “work,” because it will be an open invitation for the return of holistic/oppressive solutions to the crummy status quo—except that by then their salience will be (re)rationalized by failure of other avenues.
In the mean time, those of us who are observing these societies grow—or not—might want to keep an eye on the nexus of power discussed herein (in 4 treacherous posts). Though not the only culprit in producing a seemingly zero-sum game elitism, it is both its cornerstone and Achilles heel—a good place to start.